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 Abstract 
This research examines market power using Lau’s Hessian Identity relationships based on the 
empirical properties of duality theory.    We compare the performance of the proposed dual 
approach using Lau’s Hessian Identity relationships with the simple traditional dual approach.     
 
Keywords: Lau’s Hessian Identity, Monte Carlo simulation, Market Power, Monopoly  
 
Introduction  
Through the “New Empirical Industrial Organization” (NEIO) literature, there are many market 
power studies in recent years.    Following Bresnahan (1982), most NEIO studies estimate 
monopoly market power exertion from first-order profit maximization conditions using 
aggregate industry (or country) data.    Several studies test for market power such as Ashenfelter 
and Sullivan (1987), Schroeter (1988), Azzam (1997), Sexton (2000) and Paul (2001). 
In contrast, Love and Shumway (1994) suggest a nonparametric approach to test for 
market power exertion that does not require specifying functional forms for supply or demand.     
Love and Shumway (1994) extended market power tests from previous studies (Chavas and Cox 
1988; Fawson and Shumway 1987; Ashenfelter and Sullivan 1987) for an input market.    Love 
and Shumway (1994) developed a nonparametric deterministic test for monopsony market power 
using a normalized quadratic restricted cost function with one variable input and one input for 
which the firm has potential market power.    Their nonparametric market power estimates are 
consistent with actual Lerner index and results indicate that monopsony market power decreases 
with factor supply elasticity.    However there are exceptions where nonparametric market power 
1 
 estimates with technical change and shifting supply are inconsistent with actual Lerner index 
(Love and Shumway, 1994).   
The dual approach assumes price taking behavior for a profit maximizing firm and cost 
minimizing  firm.  The  unrestricted  profit  function contains the same economic information as 
the indirect cost function (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).    Lau (1976) developed a general set of 
Hessian Identities under perfect competition that permits additional valuable information to be 
derived from the profit function.    Lusk et al. (2002) empirically examined the relationship 
between the parameters of production function, unrestricted profit function and restricted profit 
function. 
Objectives 
The objective of this paper is twofold.  First,  the  study  proposes  to examine market power using 
Lau’s Hessian Identity relationships (Lau 1976).    Second, the study assesses the performance of 
the proposed dual approach using Lau’s Hessian Identity relationships comparing with the 
simple dual approach. 
Methods and Procedures 
Our approach is completed using two steps: 1) using a production function and a market demand 
function optimal input and output quantities are estimated under different input price regimes 
with output choice determining output price under monopoly power, and 2) estimate cost 
function and profit function using Lau’s Hessian Identities, estimate the cost function from the 
profit function estimates.     
Following Lusk et al. (2002), data used to estimate market power are simulated through 
Monte Carlo simulation techniques.    Monte Carlo simulation techniques are used for obtaining 
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 data by simulating a statistical model that has all assumed numeric parameters.    For the data 
generation process, we use the firm’s profit maximization problem for a single output and four 
input production function.    We assume a quadratic production function of one output-four input 
function as: 
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where Y is the output quantity and     is  the  ith input quantity.    We set an intercept to zero so 
that no output comes without any inputs.    Following Lusk et al. (2002), the parameters are 
chosen so that economic regularity conditions were met.     
Since this study’s purpose is to examine market power using Lau’s Hessian Identity 
relationships, output price P is not given.    We assumed the output price P is an inverse demand 
function for monopoly case so that we can also simulate prices as an inverse demand function 
with a quadratic form of output.  The  inverse  demand  function that the monopolist faces is 
assumed to be: 
    250   .01  
After set up the production function and the inverse demand function, we can set the firm’s profit 
maximization problem as: 
max              
 
   
 
After substituting the inverse demand function into the firm’s profit maximization and 
rearranging the profit function is: 
3 
 max    250  0.01          
 
   
 
where Y is the production function previously defined and     is  the  ith input price. The 
first-order conditions of the profit maximization problem for the four inputs are determined an 
set to zero: 
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Given input prices, we use SHAZAM for solving the system of four equations simultaneously. 
Input prices are randomly generated and firms take input prices as exogenous (a competitive 
input market).    A normal distribution is assumed and input prices were randomly generated in 
SHAZAM.    In this study, the output price and the output were calculated by the input prices 
and input quantity values that were calculated from the system of first-order conditions. 
Lau’s Hessian Identities 
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 Lau (1976) provided the Hessian identities to show the equivalence of estimates from 
the restricted profit, unrestricted profit and production functions.    We used the coefficients for 
the production function that Lusk et al. (2002) assumed for their estimation.  Thus  the  true 
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where       are the second-order derivatives of the production function,       are the second-order 
derivatives of the unrestricted profit function and  Θ   are the matrix identities of the 
second-order derivatives of the restricted profit function defined by Lau (1976).    Above direct 
matrices relationship between production, unrestricted profit and restricted profit functions are 
shown by Lau (1976).    Therefore, using Lau’s Hessian ideantities, “estimates from any one of 
the three forms can be used to determine estimates from the other two” (Lusk et al. 2002).   
Table 1 shows simulated input and output prices by Monte Carlo simulation  techniques.  Table 
2 lists assumed coefficient values for the production function from Lusk et al. (2002).    Table 3 
shows given input prices for the profit maximization problem.    Table 4, 5 and 6 are the 
estimated results for restricted, unrestricted profit functions and production function. 
If we find output is monopoly, then the estimated cost function derived from the profit 
function and the cost function will not be equal. A test will then be constructed from that 
5 
 difference. We expect to find different results of market power for two approaches. This result is 
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 Table 1. Simulated Input and Output Quantities by Monte Carlo Simulation Techniques 





Y                 127.16    
Reported values are the mean input and output quantities from 5000 repetitions. 
 
Table 2. Assumed Coefficient Values for the Production Function from Lusk et al. (2002) 














a34                    0.13    
Source Lusk et al. (2002) 
 
Table 3. Input Prices for the Profit Maximization Problem from Lusk et al. (2002)  




W4                 95    
Reported values are the mean input and output quantities from 5000 repetitions. 
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 Table 4. Estimated Results for Restricted Profit Function  
   Coefficient Std.  Err. T-Ratio     
CONST 119.27  100.8 1.1832
W1 -0.76304  0.49171 -1.5518
W2 -2.1189  0.89623 -2.3643
W3 -0.81101  0.46397 -1.748
X4 -27.858  201.29 -0.1384
W11 -2.08E-03  1.15E-03 -1.812
W22 -4.19E-03  1.51E-03 -2.7745
W33 -3.29E-03  6.58E-04 -5.0088
W44A -33.358  200.93 -0.16602
W12 -1.20E-03  7.38E-04 -1.6214
W13 2.37E-03  8.81E-04 2.694
W14A 0.21141  0.4868 0.43428
W23 2.80E-03  8.55E-04 3.2814
W24A -1.1443  0.90192 -1.2688
W34A  0.20858 0.46129 0.45215     
 
Table 5. Estimated Results for Unrestricted Profit Function 
   Coefficient Std.  Err.  T-Ratio      
CONST 130.98  0.83209 157.42
W1 -1.0089  0.064801 -15.569
W2 -0.9065  0.15375 -5.8959
W3 -1.1139  0.06462 -17.237
W4 -0.89295  0.082147 -10.87
W11 -2.32E-03  4.64E-03 -0.49955
W22 7.04E-03  1.56E-02 0.45211
W33 -7.91E-03  3.21E-03 -2.4671
W44 0.0050808  0.007004 0.72547
W12 -4.89E-03  5.40E-03 -0.9057
W13 4.10E-03  2.64E-03 1.5516
W14 0.0003967  0.003285 0.12075
W23 1.00E-02  5.16E-03 1.942
W24 -0.010429  0.009168 -1.1377





Table 6. Estimated Results for Production Function 
      Coefficient Std.  Err.  T-Ratio 
X1 -201.38  14.17 -14.22
X2 -70.043  13.63 -5.138
X3 -1.0496  14.69 -7.14E-02
X4 10.592  6.9 1.535
X11 -152.83  19.57 -7.81
X22 -17.83  7.826 -2.278
X33 10.676  8.068 1.323
X44 0.113  0.9013 0.1254
X12 -46.303  9.052 -5.115
X13 -8.7084  7.352 -1.184
X14 6.4669  3.804 1.7
X23 -6.4498  5.23 -1.233
X24 0.51601  1.816 0.2841
X34     3.5169 2.428 1.449
 
 
 